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Abstract
Social Contract Theory and Transitional Justice:
A Philosophical Approach to a Problem of Global Importance
by
Brendan Moriarty

Advisor: Charles Mills

In this thesis, I seek to bring together two areas of scholarly work to see how each can inform the
other: social contract theory and transitional justice. The social contract, as it exists and as it was
theorized about by Rousseau, was born from the world-historic forces that spread capitalism
across the globe, stirring up nationalism everywhere it went. In its wake, there was vast
inequality and new legal regimes which protected the hoarded wealth of the capitalist class by
enshrining the right of private property along with life and liberty. To examine the intricacies of
transitional justice and its mechanisms, I primarily study the examples of Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia. From these cases there are many examples of transitional justice mechanisms: two
international criminal tribunals, hybrid courts, truth and reconciliation commissions, special war
crimes courts, indigenous forms of dispute resolution, lustration, and amnesties. I attempt to
answer three questions: Why do people commit genocide? What is the social contract under
transitional justice? Is there a third state of nature? To answer these questions I draw upon a
diverse body of literature from multiple disciplines. I hope that my approach to these subjects
illuminates new ways of thinking about social contract theory and transitional justice.
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Introduction
Before the United Nations and the League of Nations, before the Rome statute and the
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and before the Bolshevik and French revolutions,
Immanuel Kant wrote in 1784 that to understand the history of humanity, one must look at it
from a point of view which stipulates that the ultimate purpose of the human race is to create a
perfect civic constitution. In his “Idea for a Universal History,” Kant conjectured that historians
ought to conduct their work with these principles in mind: humankind will fully develop its
natural capacities through the use of reason, that Nature has willed that humanity will develop its
natural capacities by evolving beyond its animal instincts, that the natural antagonisms of human
beings will lead them to create universal civic society governed by law, and that through reason,
we might be able to discern the ‘secret plan’ which Nature has for us.
Unfortunately, it is not through reason, at first, that humanity will choose to create a
universal civic society. In the end, “after devastations, revolutions, and even complete
exhaustion, [nature] brings [humanity] to that which reason could have told them at the
beginning and with far less sad experience, to wit, to step from lawless condition of savages into
a league of nations.”1 Kant goes on to accurately predict that “the impact of any revolution on all
states on [Europe], so closely knit together through commerce, will be so obvious that the other
states, driven by their own danger but without any legal basis, will offer themselves as arbiters,
and thus they will prepare the way for a distant international government for which there is no
precedent in human history.”2 It is from these words that we can understand both the social
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Ibid., 23.

2

contract and transitional justice: the movement towards the creation of a perfect civic
constitution, driven by violent conflict and through fictionalized legal basis.
In my thesis, I analyze the social contract and transitional justice by the application of
philosophical, sociological, and political theories to see how each topic can inform the other. I
believe that my research could inform scholars from multiple areas of academic study —
philosophers could learn about the real life examples of people writing social contracts and
political scientists could see how a universalizing approach to understanding human events could
contextualize transitional justice mechanisms. I begin by sketching out the social contract of
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. I focus on the emergence from the state of nature and Charles Mills’
‘domination contract’ in particular. I go on to take up the real life examples of transitional justice
in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. In the final sections I answer three questions: why do
people commit genocide, what is the social contract under transitional justice, and could we
conceive of a third state of nature. I use Claudia Card’s theory of evil, Charles Tilly’s theory of
contentious politics, and Elizabeth Anderson’s theory of moral progress, among others, to
answer these questions.
It may seem out of place to pick the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as the primary
examples of transitional justice to which social contract theory is applied because mainstream
academics tend to see contract theory as concerning Western liberal democracies and capitalism.
The reason I picked my examples is because they offered good contrasts. In the former
Yugoslavia you have a higher level of industrialization whereas Rwanda is mostly resource
extraction and agrarian economics. Moreover, Rwanda is a former colony whereas the republics
of the former Yugoslavia were never colonized. Additionally, these two cases probably more
than anywhere else had a high density of transitional justice mechanisms. Lastly, I was simply

3

unable to choose a Western capitalist, liberal democracy because there really was no country
which consciously deployed transitional justice mechanisms. In the best possible cases of
transitions — Spain with Franco and Portugal with Salazar — there was no transitional justice
beyond some lustration and impunity, which is by definition the absence of applied justice. 3 It
might seem natural that the Nuremberg trials would count as an example, but they concern
crimes committed by a fascist government — hardly an example of government with the consent
of the governed — and the trials mostly concerned crimes committed outside Germany, against
the Allied combatants. It was victor's justice. Perhaps the only applicable example I could find
was in Northern Ireland with the Good Friday Agreement, which I briefly discuss at the end.
This being said, I believe that Rousseau’s account of a class contract and what Mills
describes as the domination contract is something that could be applied the world over, not just
Western countries as mainstream contract theorists would have it applied. This is because class
divisions have existed and domination has happened throughout history and across the world.
Although the conditions which produced the social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke,
Rousseau, and Kant may not be present in many of the areas of the world undergoing transitional
justice, I believe social contract theory still has import because of Rousseau’s account of what
really is the social contract.

3
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1. Social Contract Theory and the Domination Contract
In the following section I present Rousseau’s account of the social contract. In particular,
I focus on the concept of emergence from the state of nature and the creation of political authority.
Additionally, I present what Charles Mills defines as the ‘domination contract.’ I use their theories
as the baseline for discussing the social contract and transitional justice.
At the most basic level, social contract theories have both a descriptive and prescriptive
aspect. All social contract theories seek to describe the nature of human beings, how human nature
leads individuals to come together to form societies, and the arrangement of political authority that
tends to take hold in these societies. The prescriptive aspect details which arrangement best orders
society so as to maximize principles such as liberty, equality, and justice. Modern contractarians
tend to distinguish a number of contracts within the ‘social contract,’ such as a political contract
and a moral contract, which outlines the moral codes that regulate behavior within our society.
Discussions regarding the moral contract tend to focus on the morality of pre-political ‘society’
under the state of nature, or at least the proto-society before the creation of political authority, and
whether or not there are natural laws which prescribe a universal moral code. Some theorists argue
that the moral codes of the state of nature constrain the reach of the political contract, whereas
others believe that the political contract creates morality as conventional rules. 4
There is also an epistemological contract, or at least an epistemological aspect to the social
contract. The epistemological contract can be thought of as “an idealized consensus about
cognitive norms and... about what counts as a correct, objective interpretation of the world, and
for agreeing to this view, one is granted full cognitive standing in the polity, the official epistemic
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community.”5 The social contract creating the official epistemic community is important when
thinking about ingroups and outgroups.
We must also consider that social contract theory is not merely a subject of academic
curiosity, it is a cultural and historical object — something used by political actors to guide
deliberations and decisions, and even being used to justify policies. Perhaps the very study of the
social contract has itself changed the course of human development. Regardless, it is a historical
fact that politicians, military commanders, and other leaders have, at a minimum, invoked the idea
of the social contract to inspire support for their agendas. Famously, the remains of Rousseau were
moved to the Panthéon to lay with Voltaire during the French Revolution. 6
We should also distinguish between ideal theory and non-ideal theory. Somewhat similar
to the distinction between prescriptive and descriptive modes of analysis, ideal theory with regards
to the social contract concerns the theorizing about society under ideal conditions. What might a
perfect society look like? Non-ideal theory concerns theorizing about society under non-ideal
conditions. How could an imperfect society be made to look better? Because this thesis seeks to
explore the intersection of social contract theory and transitional justice, I am concerned with nonideal theory.
Because I am concerned with non-ideal theory, the way that I use the ‘state of nature’ in
this thesis at times departs from the strict interpretation that is commonly used. Additionally, I
want to discuss situations where there is not an accepted political authority which guarantees the
rights and liberties of individuals and moral norms are universally accepted, but there is a level of
sociability which rises above what most philosophers might consider to be the state of nature. So
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by state of nature, I may not always be talking about the strict interpretation, but a somewhat
broader understanding that I use to answer questions.
Next, I briefly summarize Rousseau’s accounts of the emergence from the state of nature
and the establishment of political authority. What is important to understand about Rousseau’s
theory is that he is offering a conjectural history of human development. He does not attempt to
present an actual anthropological account. Instead, the point of this conjectural history is to
explicate why people might forfeit their ‘natural rights’ — rights we hold under the state of nature
— and accept political authority. Unlike the account of the social contract by Rousseau that I
present, the emergence from the state of nature and acceptance of political authority, in prescriptive
theory, is used to justify a political system because people are said to offer the consent of the
governed. In reality, most people do not consent to their form of government or the arrangement
of social relations. To paraphrase Marx, we make our own history, but not under circumstances of
our own choosing.
At first, individuals are alone, out in the world basically by themselves. Next, there is a sort
of utopian proto-society as people’s natural inclinations lead to compassion and cooperation. As
relative levels of inequality rise, jealousy and vainglory overcomes some people, leading to
conflict and violence. According to Rousseau, “consuming ambition, the zeal for raising the
relative level of his fortune... inspires in all men a wicked tendency to harm one another” and
eventually “[t]here arose between the right of the strongest and the right of the first occupant a
perpetual conflict that ended only in fights and murders. Emerging society gave way to the most
horrible state of war.”7 At this point there is already a good amount of social cooperation and
industriousness. This is not quite the state of nature because there is a level of sociability. This
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interim between the state of nature, where humans are thought to be alone in the world, and the
state of society under political authority can be considered, or at least I consider, a part of a broad
interpretation of the state of nature insofar as the rights of individuals are not secured by a
government and moral norms may not be universally understood and respected. It is here that the
buds of a future society are planted because of the rise of inequality.
The need for the creation of the state then comes from a mutual desire to secure one’s
belongings and persons against the attacks of others. Unlike under Hobbes’ conception, where the
creation of state is rational and reasonable for all members, 8 it is not universally rational, but only
rational for the rich, and is a ruse perpetrated on the poor. According to Rousseau:
Alone against all and unable on account of mutual jealousies to unite with his equals against
enemies united by the common hope of plunder, the rich, pressed by necessity, finally
conceived the most thought-out project that ever entered the human mind. It was to use in
his favor the very strength of those who attacked him, to turn his adversaries into his
defenders, to instill in them other maxims, and to give them other institutions... Such was,
or should have been, the origin of society and laws, which gave new fetters to the weak
and new forces to the rich, irretrievably destroyed natural liberty, established forever the
law of property and of inequality, changed adroit usurpation into an irrevocable right, and
for the profit of a few ambitious men henceforth subjected the entire human race to labor,
servitude and misery. 9
The reason for Rousseau’s view of the emergence from the state of nature is his belief that the
current social contract is bad because it is what Charles Mills calls a ‘domination contract.’ 10 He
believes that a good contract could be created, which he details in “On the Social Contract,” but
this subject is not discussed in this thesis.
Rousseau is offering a specific type of domination contract. Rather than the social contract
being a covenant between and among all members of a society, or even representatives for said
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members, the social contract is really an agreement between the powerful elites to set the terms of
how they will rule in society, thereby perpetuating the domination of everyone else. We can think
of white supremacy as a contract among whites to define whiteness, against all of the other nonwhites in our societies, and in the globe, and then privileging the status of whiteness. We can also
think of patriarchy as a contract between and among men to define the terms of masculinity and
femininity and the division of labor so as to perpetuate the domination of women. Rousseau’s
account is that of a class contract. Before the establishment of political authority, people only had
a natural right to their property owing to their possession of it. With the emergence from the state
of nature, the social contract defines the terms of property ownership, creating private property
and securing the wealth of the powerful elites. Instead of allowing for a true democracy, the class
contract allows for control of the state by the wealthy few, and later corporations. It is their consent
which most politicians elicit, offering only a fig leaf of participation in government to the poor so
they do not revolt.
What is most important about Rousseau’s theory is that Rousseau’s emergence from the
state of nature is achieved in stages and allows for cycles. There are four stages in the emergence
from the broad interpretation of the state of nature which would unfold over a long period of time.
The first stage is that of primitive human beings, which is the strict interpretation of the state of
nature and subsequent stages are merely interim stages. In the second stage, we have the
beginnings of society with the development of tools, weapons, and language. The third stage is the
patriarchal stage, where the only ‘political’ authority (not truly political) is the father and the polity
is the family. The fourth and last stage is the beginnings of inequality, as described earlier, with
the creation of the domination contract built on class. The transition from the third stage to the
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fourth stage is what I consider to be the emergence from the (broad interpretation of the) state of
nature, into a state of society with political authority.
After the development of civil society, we get three more stages of development, or epochs
of inequality. In the first epoch, we get the establishment of laws and private property, referred to
as the rule of the rich over the poor. In the second epoch, we get the creation of magistrates, referred
to as the rule of the powerful over the weak. In the third and final epoch, the transition of legitimate
political authority into arbitrary power, which is referred to as the rule of the masters over slaves.
Under this arbitrary power, we return to a state of nature as our rights are no longer protected, and
everything is up to the capricious whims of despots. All that can happen next is tyranny, social
collapse, and/or revolution. So, it must be understood that under Rousseau, there are in fact two
states of nature. The state of “nature in its purity, and [the second state of nature] is the fruit of an
excess of corruption.”11 Rousseau is the only theorist who offers an account of a second state of
nature. This second state of nature is not a traditional, strict interpretation of a state of nature
because there are extensive social relations; however, Rousseau argues — and I concur with him
— that this second state of nature ought to be considered a state of nature because the rights and
liberties of individuals are no longer guaranteed by a political authority and there may not be
universally understood and respected moral norms. As Rousseau states, “there is so little difference
between these two states, and the governmental contract is so utterly dissolved by despotism, that
the despot is master only as long as he is the strongest; and as soon as he can be ousted, he has no
cause to protest against violence. The uprising that ends in the strangulation or the dethronement
of a sultan is as lawful an act as”12 his tyrannical decrees of violence. Political authority does exist,
but because it is tyrannical, there is no guarantee of rights and because there is tyrannical rule,
11
12
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agents of the state have little accountability to people and may act against any previously
understood and respected moral norms.
What is also important about Rousseau’s stages of development and epochs of inequality
is that his theory points to, or at least allows for, the existence of multiple social contracts over
time, and not just the Social Contract as postulated by Hobbes, himself, Locke, and Kant. As I
state from the beginning, Rousseau’s account of humanity’s emergence from the state of nature is
not to be taken literally, and is rather a conjectural history. As I quote in a larger block, Rousseau
comments on his account of the stages of development by stating “[s]uch was, or should have been,
the origin of society and laws.”13 Looking at the actual history of human development, however,
shows that we have had society and political authority for a long time before the Enlightenment,
and power was not yet arranged in the fashion described by the likes of Locke, Kant, or Rousseau
until modernity. As such, we must conclude that there existed what could be understood as a type
of social contract, even if incomplete. In fact, there were quite literal social contracts that existed
in feudal society prior to and existing during the Enlightenment.
According to Silvia Federici, there were extensive feudal social contracts which regulated
the social relations of European society. These early ‘social contracts’ which made, “ ‘privileges’
and ‘charters’ that fixed the burdens and granted” the right for a degree of local self-government,
while also allowing for the “commutation of labor services with money payments (money rents,
money taxes) that placed the feudal relation on a more contractual basis.” 14 There are additional
corresponding documents that preceded and contributed to social contract theory. Charles Mills
points to “papal bulls and other theological pronouncements; European discussions about
colonialism, ‘discovery,’ and international law; pacts, treaties, and legal decisions... which
13
14

Ibid., 70.
Federici, Caliban and the Witch, 28. Italics were by the author.

11

collectively can be seen, not just metaphorically, but close to literally, as [the] conceptual, juridical,
and normative equivalent”15 to the signing of a social contract. Millls’ presentation focuses on the
relation between white European society and the rest of the non-white world, but I believe that the
nature of the domination contract entails a degree of application to inter-European affairs. All of
this is to say that there were social contracts long before the Social Contract as envisioned by the
Enlightenment, and that Rousseau’s theory best explains how new social contracts arose. During
times of either war, revolution, or tyranny, there is a devolution into the first or second states of
nature, as broadly interpreted, from which the eventual resolution of conflict can arise a new social
contract. This is not to say that a new contract is always obtained — the forces of counterrevolution
or established powers may succeed. It is only with the Enlightenment that we get the Social
Contract — the modern social contract.
The transition from feudalism to capitalism necessitated the modern social contract.
Starting in the 16th century, going into the 17th century and the Enlightenment, the way that people
imagined ‘persons’ began to shift away from medieval superstition towards a new paradigm
involving the Passions and Reason. The body was no longer a plane on which celestial and
demonic beings did battle, but the “forces of Reason” and instincts of the body (the Passions)
conflicted. In this process, “a change occurs in the metaphorical field, as the philosophical
representation of individual psychology borrows images from the body-politics of the state...it is
an aspect of that broader process of social reformation, whereby” 16 the bourgeoisie sought to
remold the working classes for the growing needs of the emerging capitalist society.
Out of this, we get the emergence of “Mechanical Philosophy,” as both a product of the
changing times and a deliberate attempt to shape how the times changed. As Federici argues,
15
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“Mechanical Philosophy contributed to increasing the ruling-class control over the natural world,
control over human nature being the first, most indispensable step.” 17 Mechanical Philosophy, as
an all encompassing way of understanding the world, could only take root once the old ways of
conceiving of the world had been destroyed. So, the battle of ‘Reason’ against the psuedo-sciences
and paranormal or dark arts was not purely an academic exercise or theological campaign for the
souls of humankind, but a political project — mechanical notions of the body could not take hold
as “a model of social behavior without the destruction by the state of a vast range of pre-capitalist
beliefs, practices, and social subjects who existence contradicted the regularization of corporeal
behavior promised by Mechanical Philosophy.”18 For this reason, paired with Mechanical
Philosophy, the Age of Reason came also with the revival of philosophical skepticism. Skepticism
was necessary to get rid of the pre-capitalist beliefs and practices, but its application would extend
into other areas of philosophy.
If Mechanical Philosophy guided theories of social control, then it’s important to
understand the schools of Mechanical Philosophy and which one prevailed. The two main models
of the body as a machine were the Cartesian model and the Hobbesian model. On the Cartesian
view, the individual is capable of developing internal mechanisms of discipline and management.
As such, individuals could voluntarily regulate their own conduct, and interact with government
based on consent. On the Hobbesian model, people are not capable of self-discipline, and therefore
a coercive, absolute state was necessary to produce the incentives necessary to make people
behave. This is because there was no Reason independent of the body, and therefore the body
could not be trained to act in a different manner than originally intended.

17
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For the Cartesian model, the relationship between the mind and body would mirror the
relationship between the state and society. With the mind and the will taking sovereign control
over the body, “the counterpart of the mechanization of the body is the development of Reason in
its role as judge, inquisitor, manager, administrator. We find here the origins of bourgeois
subjectivity as self-management, self-ownership, law, responsibility, with its corollaries of
memory and identity.”19 Because individuals are seen as capable of self-managing, the necessity
of concentrating power in the state to control people’s behavior is lessened; instead, power is
decentralized and centered in each person. As such, “[t]he development of self-management...
becomes an essential requirement in a capitalist socio-economic system in which self ownership
is assumed to be the fundamental social relation.”20 According to Federici, it is this model which
wins out over the Hobbesian model. The Cartesian model allows for the democratizing of the
methods of social discipline. Under the Hobbesian model, success can only be achieved through
the absolute rule of the state. It is not that the former is preferable, but simply that it is practical.
Given the focus on socialization, and the similar (albeit not the same) views on dualism, 21
Rousseau’s philosophy continues the Cartesian model.
With the failure of the Hobbesian model, and the success of the Cartesian model, it should
be clear why the domination contract was able to succeed. The purpose of tricking the poor into
‘consenting’ to the creation of legitimate political authority, or at least offering people a philosophy
that says that government operates with the consent of the governed even if its not actually true, is
to democratize social control. Rousseau called the creation of the state the most thought-out project
that ever entered the human mind because what was required was convincing people to love their

19
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own chains and their own jailers. With the Cartesian model, the modern social contract that took
form in Europe, and then spread across the world, was a particular version of a contract. By
obscuring the true masters of society (the capitalist class), governments could avoid falling into
tyranny, and, therefore, avoid the necessity of a new social contract.
When discussing social contract theory, authors would be remiss not to acknowledge John
Rawls, the preeminent contract theorist of the 20th century. In his 1971 magnum opus titled A
Theory of Justice, Rawls provided a new method of understanding how one could conceive of an
ideal, prescriptive social contract. In his words, the aim of his book was to “present a conception
of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the
social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant.” 22 According to Rawls, that best
method by which we could conceive of the best principles of justice is by deploying a thought
experiment whereby we imagine ourselves existing in an original position — not a state of nature,
but a sort of state of ethereal existence — behind a veil of ignorance which shields us from knowing
our defining features (race, sex, income level, etc.) From here, individuals would have to determine
the principles that would order society and from which laws would be derived to constitute an
ideal government. According to Rawls, because people do not know who in society they would
be, individuals in the original position would seek to maximize the benefits of the people in the
minimum position of society so that the worst off are still better off than the worst off in any other
formed society. As such, individuals in the original position would come up with two key
principles — the liberty principle and equality principle — to order society, and he called the
ordering of this society justice as fairness. 23

22
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For Rawls, the social contract is a metaphor for understanding how political power should
be constructed and deployed and how social relations should be arranged. The original position,
and the removal of the veil of ignorance, reflect the emergence from the state of nature in the state
of society. Justice as fairness is seen as the obtaining of the consent of the governed insofar as the
two principles are seen as what people would willingly choose for themselves, and all other
arrangements of society and government which flow from justice as fairness are likewise endorsed
by people because they are entailed by justice as fairness.
Seeking to apply his idea of the original position and the veil of ignorance to international
affairs, Rawls wrote The Law of Peoples in 1993.24 Instead of conceiving of international affairs
as concerning states, Rawls chose to think of the principles of global justice as laws of peoples
because what matters is the relations between people, and that states and governments are only
instruments by which people’s interests are mediated. As he argues in A Theory of Justice, society
is “more or less a self-sufficient association of persons who in their relations to one another
recognize certain rules of conduct as binding and who for the most part act in accordance with
them... [and] a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.” 25 As such, it may seem
natural to talk about Rawls in a thesis which engages with social contract theory and issues of
global justice. I do not seek to apply Rawls’ theories in my thesis for a couple of reasons.
Foremost, I do not want to apply Rawls to my thesis because, as I make clear, this thesis is
concerned with non-ideal theory, while Rawls’ is (mostly) concerned with ideal theory. When
talking about transitional justice, one is necessarily talking about non-ideal conditions. It would be
of course taken as a given that behind a veil of ignorance people in the original position would
condemn genocide and ethnic cleansing. But because they are ignorant of their identities and have
24
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never experienced genocide or war themselves, these individuals would be incapable of conceiving
of what mechanisms best deal with issues of corrective justice and how to respond to atrocities.
The epistemological barrier which Rawls uses to justify justice as fairness renders his theory
unable to seriously grapple with transitional justice at an ontological level. It may be possible to
adjust his theories to transitional justice but such a project would be a thesis topic unto itself. As
such, I do not engage with Rawls in this thesis.
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2. Transitional Justice in Rwanda
Rwanda was colonized by Germany in 1884, lasting until 1916, after which the League of
Nations, and later the United Nations (UN), placed it under Belgian Trusteeship until 1962.
Although Rwanda had been under a Tutsi monarchy before and during colonial rule, ethnic
categories were not rigid; under Belgian rule, though, ethnic membership was codified and
exploited. In 1959, a Hutu revolution overthrew the monarchy, driving Tutsi refugees into
neighboring countries, and, two years later, Major-General Juvénal Habyarimana seized power in
a military coup. President Habyarimana announced, in 1990, that he would allow for multi-party
elections; not long after, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) attacked from Uganda. Combined
with government supported propaganda, Tutsis residing in Rwanda were labelled as accomplices
of the RPF and many Hutu opposition party members were cast as traitors. After sporadic
fighting and broken ceasefires, the “Arusha Accords” was negotiated in 1993 with UN
implementation assistance. On April 6th, 1994, the President’s plane was shot down,
precipitating the genocide.26
Less than four months after the RPF declared a unilateral ceasefire, the UN Security
Council (UNSC) established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) by
resolution 955.27 Although Rwanda had lobbied for its creation, they voted against the
resolution.28 One strong reason for Rwanda’s opposition to the ICTR was that the most stringent
sentence for those convicted was only life in prison, and not execution. The logics,
competencies, and structure of the tribunal more or less mirrors that of the International Criminal
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Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 29 except that the ICTR was located in Arusha
instead of the Hague, its temporal jurisdiction (January 1st - December 31st 1994) was narrower,
and that only violations of Article III of the Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol II
applied.30 Moreover, the ICTR’s mandate, unlike the ICTY, states a third purpose for its
establishment — national reconciliation — in addition to maintaining peace and redressing
violations.31
The first trial in the ICTR began in the final days of 1996, a few weeks after the first
domestic trials.32 On September 2nd 1998, Jean-Paul Akayesu was found guilty on seven counts
of Crimes against Humanity, one count of Genocide, one count of Direct and Public Incitement
to Commit Genocide, and not guilty on six other counts. 33 He was the mayor of Taba commune
in Gitaram prefecture. This was the first the conviction by the ICTR and first conviction for
Genocide in any international court; two days later, the ICTR found Jean Kambanda, the
caretaker prime minister at the beginning of the genocide, guilty one of count of Genocide,
Conspiracy to Commit Genocide, Direct and Public Incitement to Commit Genocide, Complicity
in Genocide, and two counts of Crimes Against Humanity — the first conviction of a head of
government on these violations.34 Both were sentenced to life imprisonment. The median
sentence of the ICTR, as of June 2010, was 33.5 years. 35 As of June 2016, the ICTR has indicted
93 individuals of which 61 were convicted and 14 acquitted. 36
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In Rwanda, the volume of arrests overwhelmed the domestic court system, with estimates
ranging from 100,000 to 120,000 citizens imprisoned, potentially facing trial. 37 They only
presented an economic determinant, as it represented a significant drain on the labor supply. By
2004, only 10,026 cases had been handled. 38 As of 2005 the International Committee of the Red
Cross estimated 89,000 accused remained in detention. 39 In 1995, Rwanda convened an
international conference to explore different accountability mechanisms for genocide and
implemented new legislation the following year in “Organic Law No. 08/96, Organization of
Prosecutions for Offenses Constituting Genocide or Crimes against Humanity committed since
October 1, 1990.”40 Organic Law No. 08/96 (OL 08/96) created four categories to classify
genocide suspects based on the nature and scope of involvement in the genocide, suspects were
to be tried in new Specialized Chambers, and new regulations on compensation and reparation
procedures were created.41 The four categories were as follows:
Category 1:
a) person whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among
the planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors and leaders of the crime of genocide or
of a crime against humanity :
b) persons who acted in positions of authority at the national, perfectoral, communal,
sector or cell level, or in a political party, the or fostered such crimes;
c) notorious murderers who by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which they
committed atrocities, distinguished themselves in their areas of residence or where they
passed;
d) persons who committed acts sexual torture;
Category 2:
persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among
perpetrators, conspirators of accomplices of intentional homicide or of serious assault
against the person causing death;
Category 3:
persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation make them guilty of
other serious assaults against the person;
37
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Category 4:
persons who committed offences against property.42
Building off of OL 08/96, The Rwandan Transitional National Assembly adopted
Organic Law no. 40/2000 (OL 40/00) ‘on the Establishment of ‘‘Gacaca Jurisdictions’’ and the
Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes
Against Humanity Committed between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994.’ 43 The gacaca
courts, under OL 40/00 assumed jurisdiction over crimes which fell under categories 2-4 of OL
OL 08/96, added rape to category 1, and suspects accused of category 1 crimes were still
processed under the Specialized Courts. “Gacaca” had existed since pre-colonial times, but was
marginalized as colonial authorities imposed Western systems. 44 Under Habyarimana, the gacaca
process enjoyed some renewed use, but acquired a reputation as a government tool more than a
local level institution. In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, the pre-colonial form of
Gacaca returned and “[e]lders and community members once again began to preside over cases
and hand out judgments independent of any national or local governmental oversight.” 45
Borrowing from the gacaca process, OL 04/00 sought to modernize and formalize it with
five goals in mind: “establish the truth about what happened; accelerate the legal proceedings for
those accused of genocide crimes; eradicate the culture of impunity; reconcile Rwandans and
reinforce their unity; and use the capacities of Rwandan society to deal with its problems through
a justice based on Rwandan custom."46 In June 2002, 80 pilot gacaca courts were established and
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in 2006 the gacaca system began operation nationwide; by April 2009, approximately 12,000
gacaca courts with over 169,000 judges had completed 1.1 million cases. 47
The efficiency of the gacaca process is not just a result of different court procedures —
there is a fundamental difference in the structure and aim of gacaca courts. There are two phases:
information gathering and the trial. In the first phase, accusations are made, testimony collected,
more accusations and testimony based on earlier information, and finally judges categorize
suspects based on alleged offenses. There are three categories: the first category essentially
corresponds to the first category from OL 08/97, the second category has three subcategories
which essentially corresponds to the other three categories from OL 08/96, and the third category
deals with property offenses.48 In the trial phase, category one offenses are referred to the courts
established under OL 08/96 (until 2008 when some were moved to gacaca courts), category two
are referred to “sector” level courts, and category three are referred to “cell” level courts.
Because of this structure, trials often take place in the village of the accused and deliberations are
open to the community members. In the case of category three offenses, parties may even settle
the dispute between themselves with judges acting as supervisors and ratifiers of final
agreements. Most importantly, both in sentencing guidelines and the material structure of the
proceedings themselves, confessions are encouraged. 49 Placing a high value on confessions
supports more speedy trials as well as an atmosphere of reconciliation as lower level offenders
appeal for re-integration with their former communities.
One last note before moving to the next section. Following an agreement in 1992, a truth
commission had been established to investigate and report on atrocities since October 1, 1990
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and published mid 1993. The report was well received domestically and internationally, but its
work was short lived.50 Importantly, this was a truth commission set up before the Rwandan
genocide, and was intended to investigate past atrocities The work of truth and reconciliation
lives on, though, in the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), which was
created in a 1999 law.51 The work of the Rwandan government through, and in addition to, the
NURC has been in some ways laudable. The government has prioritized fighting poverty,
furthering socio-economic justice, and leading development projects as necessary for promoting
national unity and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. There have also been a number of
local associations which promote community integration. It is in these local associations where a
lot of the work of what other national truth and reconciliation commissions have done. For
instance, associations have ‘dialogue-building programs,’ encouraging repentance, and
programs to “sensitize other Rwandans with whom they live side by side in “the community to
tell the truth.”52 Having a decentralized, local process may lead to Rwandans feeling as if they
‘own’ the process more than if it was a centralized, national level process. The report argues that
the work of the local associations have promoted a sense of ‘national identity.’
Not everyone looks so positively on the NURC. Janine Clark argues that the
reconciliation project’s focus on national unity is meant to be created by a negation of ethnic
differences, thereby making a false unity wherein people can not be open and honest about the
past.53 The problem with negating ethnic differences, and instead trying to impose a ‘Rwandan
identity’ against the Tutsi and Hutu distinction, is that the argument presupposes an
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oversimplified view of the cause(s) of the genocide. It is important to understand that at least part
of the cause of the genocide was political differences, not just some old, tribal hatreds that
naturally lead to violence. Rwanda was transitioning into a multi-party democracy. Political
divisions that cut across ethnic lines would be papered over in a world where national unification
rested on the view that the opposite of unity is defined solely as ethnic division. This being said,
the author’s article is based on theoretical analyses of the NURC’s themes and programs, and not
on any empirical data.54
The last transitional justice mechanism used in response to Rwanda is universal
jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction refers to domestic criminal prosecutions for acts that are
illegal under international law, and took place outside the borders of the prosecuting state. In
2001, a Belgian court convicted two nuns for their participation in the killings of Rwandans who
sought refuge in their convent.55 The principle which guides universal jurisdiction is “the notion
that certain crimes are so harmful to international interests that states are entitled — and even
obliged — to bring proceedings against the perpetrator, regardless of the location of the crime or
the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim.”56 Universal jurisdiction is currently guided by
what are called “The Princeton Principles of Universal Jurisdiction,” based on deliberations by
the Princeton Project at Princeton University in 2001. The 14 Principles outline everything from
qualifying international crimes to basics of jurisprudence to guide prosecutions to matters of
international relations which would limit the scope of applicability. It is worth noting that
universal jurisdiction, albeit not known by the terminology at the time, is probably the oldest use
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of the discussed mechanisms. The most common crime prosecuted has been piracy, and later
slavery. War crimes and crimes against humanity are relatively new additions. 57
Although there have been a few more cases since the first prosecutions of the nuns in
Belgium, they were contained to prosecuting suspects who already resided in the host countries
and did not represent a “prosecute or extradite” form of combating impunity elsewhere. 58 The
“prosecute or extradite” principle of international law, and not just universal jurisdiction, holds
that if an accused criminal is within a state’s border, that said state has the obligation to either
prosecute the accused or to extradite him or her to a country willing to pursue a prosecution.
Examples of crimes that generally fall under the purview of “prosecute or extradite” principle
which do not apply to universal jurisdiction are terrorism and international drug trafficking. This
being said, there is significant overlap between the two ideas. 59
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3. Transitional Justice in the former Yugoslavia
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) consisted of six republics: Bosnia
and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Montenegro. After reforms to
the constitution in 1974, two autonomous regions within Serbia, Vojvodina and Kosovo, were
given more power at the federal level. Because internal boundaries rarely coincided with
demographic distribution and a weak central government, economic crises throughout the 1980s
stirred inter-ethnic tension and nationalist unrest. By 1991, Croatia and Slovenia each declared
independence, followed by a successful referendum in Macedonia, and a vote for independence
in BiH.
What distinguished the conflict in BiH and Croatia was the difference in military
capacities. Under the SFRY, the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) was composed of members of
every ethnic group, although disproportionately made up of Serbs. Each republic also had its
own military units, as well as local units of varying levels, which resembled reserves/national
guards and irregular militias which could be activated by the central government if needed.
When the wars broke out, these different units divided and coalesced along ethnic lines and
members of larger units, such as the JNA, appropriated weapons and materiel for each ethnic
groups’ use. In BiH, Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs relied on their “big brother” republics for
support; Bosnian Muslims, however, had no such protector. 60 When Slovenia and Croatia
declared independence, Slovenians and Croats in the JNA deserted and joined their respective
armies, effectively cementing Serb dominance of the JNA. Moreover, the UNSC enacted an arms
embargo in late 1991 and, despite a UN General Assembly resolution calling for an embargo
exemption for BiH which failed in the Security Council, cemented the disparity between Bosnian
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Muslims and their Serbian counterparts.61 The conflict formally ended with the Dayton
agreement on December 14 1995.62
The disparity was even greater in Kosovo. In 1989, Slobodan Milosevic, then president of
the Socialist Republic of Serbia, forced through a constitutional amendment which stripped
Kosovo’s autonomy, allowing for the centralization of security forces in Belgrade. 63 One year
later, the regional assembly unilaterally declared independence and was subsequently disbanded
by Serbian government.64 After the Dayton agreement affirmed Serbia’s territorial integrity,
lacking any formal institutions, embittered Kosovar Albanians joined the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA) and enjoyed some support from Albanian émigrés; in 1998, the KLA began to
attack Serbian officials and was met with a disproportionate response by Serbian forces. After
Milosevic rejected a US-European proposal to restore Kosovo autonomy in February 1999 and
launched an ethnic cleansing operation, NATO began a 78 day bombing campaign which
resulted in an agreement to a peacekeeping mission.65 The United Nations Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established the following day, on June 10,
1999 by UNSC resolution 1244.66
The ICTY was created on May 25, 1993 by UNSC resolution 827 and was inaugurated
on November 17, 1993 at the Peace Palace in the Hague. 67 Although Dragan Nikolic, a
commander of Bosnian Serb detention camp, faced the first indictment of the ICTY, on
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November 7, 1994,68 it would not be until May 7, 1996 that an indictee, Dusan (aka Dusko)
Tadic, a Bosnian Serb politician and former paramilitary, faced trial — almost three years after
the ICTY’s creation.69 As of August 2019, proceedings for 158 of the 161 accused have
concluded with 90 sentenced, 18 acquitted, and the other 50 referred to national courts or
concluded for other reasons.70 The median sentence handed down in the ICTY as of June 2010
was 15 years.71
As part of the Dayton agreement, BiH was divided into two regional entities, the Federal
Republic of Bosnia (or Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but hereinafter FBiH) and
Republicka Srpska (RS), with a third polity, Brčko District, created in 2000. 72 Below the regional
level, the local governments are constituted as follows: The FBiH has 10 cantons and
municipalities within each, the RS has municipalities and five district courts, and the Brčko
District has a Basic Court.73 The procedures for prosecution at the domestic levels for BiH as
well as Croatia and Serbia were determined by the 1996 Rome Agreement under “Rules of the
Road” (RoR) so as to avoid any accusations of bias. The ICTY reviewed and approved all
domestic prosecutions against alleged war criminals. 74
The Dayton agreement also established a tripartite presidency represented by one Croat,
one Serb, and one Bosniak and established the Office of the High Representative (OHR) which
was later endowed with special powers that allowed for a high degree of executive control. The
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OHR, in partnership with the ICTY, established the Bosnia War Crimes Chambers (BWCC) in
2005 and installed it within the State Court (national) system that had been established three
years prior.75 There are two other criminal courts at the State Court level, one of which handles
economic crimes and the other general crimes, and the BWCC is comprised of five three-person
panels and one five-person appellate panel. Moreover, the State Prosecutor’s office was
expanded with the addition of the Special Department for War Crimes. 76 The BWCC and the
State Prosecutor’s office were to be staffed by a mix of international and Bosnian jurists, for
which the ratio would change over time. The purpose of the Prosecutor’s office and its expansion
was to ensure that cases proceeded impartially and competently, build local judicial capacities
through the cooperative arrangement, instantiate local trust in institutions, and help justice be
done in a speedier manner.
The creation of the BWCC and the Special Department was precipitated by a winding
down of the RoR and the review authority of local prosecutions passed from the ICTY’s Office
of the Prosecutor to the national level. Moreover, as the ICTY sought to complete their work
within a timeline provided by the UNSC, cases were transferred to the national level under Rule
11 bis.77 Given the variety and scope of responsibilities, the Special Department had a
monumental task at hand: they needed to initiate prosecutions, process ICTY transfers, review
new local prosecutions, and transfer prosecutions to local courts. In 2008, the Bosnian Ministry
of Justice developed a “National War Crimes Strategy” to streamline this process and
communicate their plan to receive responsibilities. 78 According to a 2011 study by the OSCE,
between 2005 and September 2010, the BWCC has tried 166 cases, with 52 of the 68 completed
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cases resulting in convictions.79 Nonetheless, there are still a number of cases to be heard at both
the national and local level.
Although the conditions of the judiciary in BiH were quite bad, it could not compare to
that of Kosovo. Because of actions taken under Milosevic as mentioned earlier, the entire
security and legal apparatus relied on Serbian forces. After the signing of the Rambouillet
agreement, the peacekeeping mission was established two-fold: operational control fell to
NATO, which established the Kosovo Force for military presence, and civilian administration
was led by a special representative for the Secretary-General (SRSG) and through UNMIK. 80 In
2000, UNMIK issued Regulation 2000/64 which created “Regulation 64 Panels,” which were
judicial panels made up of two international judges and one Kosovo judge. Moreover, the SRSG
had the ultimate authority to replace any local jurist (i.e. judge, prosecutor, etc.) with
international personnel, which could be requested through a petition by another jurist but was
also ex proprio motu.81 Moreover, the SRSG could strike down any law passed by the Kosovo
Assembly per the Constitutional Framework promulgated on May 15, 2001. 82 This arrangement
lasted until 2008, when Kosovo declared independence from Serbia, and much of the
overarching mission mandates passed to the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
(EULEX).83
EULEX was created “to ‘Monitor, Mentor, and Advise’ or MMA all institutions related
to the rule of law while retaining executive powers to adjudicate certain categories of serious and
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complex crimes.”84 EULEX operates within the framework of UNSC Resolution 1244, the same
resolution which established UNMIK, meaning they initially shared competencies and functions.
Pursuant to its institution and capacity building mandate, EULEX worked with the Kosovo
Assembly to pass “Law No. 03/L-053 on the Jurisdiction, Case Selection and Case Allocation of
EULEX Judges and Prosecutors in Kosovo, which gave EULEX judges the authority to hear
cases in Kosovo courts under the authority of the Assembly of EULEX judges.” 85 The law also
integrated EULEX participation with the “Kosovo Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPRK) in a
complex web of organizational relations.”86
Unfortunately, due to a number of pre-existing organizational deficiencies as well as
unclear policy directions, EULEX’s use of executive functions bled into the administration of its
MMA duties, hampering capacity building goals and reminding locals of the UNMIK’s legacy. 87
Recognizing this problem, in 2012 “an agreement was signed between the Kosovo Justice
Minister, the EU Special Representative, and the head of EULEX under the Compact on Joint
Rule of Law Objectives that defines EULEX priorities for the 2012-2014 mandate.” 88 Under the
Compact, no formal authorities or powers would change; however, EULEX committed to
changing the implementation of their MMA duties, with a focus on informal mentoring,
separating the personnel who advise and monitor from those whom enact executive functions,
and a greater commitment to devolving competencies to local panels and judges. In assessing the
success of the EULEX mission to adjudicate war crimes cases, it’s important to understand the
situation which was inherited from UNMIK as well as the fact that many of the perpetrators
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would have left Kosovo in 1999. As it stands, there are currently 100 EULEX/Kosovo war
crimes investigations, five ongoing trials, 15 adjudicated cases, and 13 arrest warrants for
Serbian defendants outside of Kosovo. 89
The last policy frequently deployed in periods of transition is lustration. Lustration refers
to the removal of public officials from the bureaucracy, and the prohibition of individuals from
serving in future government positions. In BiH, significant vetting of the police force was
necessary for the post-Dayton Accords periods, as many police officers were deployed as
soldiers during the former Yugoslav wars. Additionally, judges and prosecutors required vetting,
as the weak judiciary required trustworthy jurists while UNMIK and EULEX was underway.
From 1999 to 2002, 24,000 police officers were vetted and approximately 1,000 judges and
prosecutors were vetted from 2002 to 2004.90 Lustration can be an important policy tool in
limiting the influence of previous regimes when mass prosecutions may be politically infeasible.
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4. A Dialogue Between Social Contract Theory and Transitional Justice
In the following section, I apply social contract theory to issues of transitional justice,
combined with other sociological, political, and philosophical theories. I use these theories to
answer three questions: Why do people commit genocide? What is the social contract under
transitional justice? What should the international community do to help countries under
transitional justice?
Before addressing these questions, it is first important to look at what has already been said
about the combined subject. In looking through the literature, I could not find that much discussion
of both subjects. Most references to social contract theory and transitional justice briefly mention
the social contract, and invite the reader to imagine transitional justice as being a moment of
creating a new social contract, and then quickly moves on from that point. For instance, in a three
year strategic plan, the International Center for Transitional Justice mentions the social contract
once, invoking the metaphor to talk about new constitutions.91 In a journal article about indigenous
rights and relations in New Zealand, the author similarly references the social contract to talk about
a treaty between Maori tribes and the British settlers as a reimagined social contract which founded
the eventual New Zealand state.92 I could only find two sources that tried to talk extensively about
what the social contract is and how that could inform transitional justice.
In a book on the transitions from communism to liberal democracy in Eastern Europe, Noel
Calhoun discusses what she identifies as the ‘five key tools’ of the ideology of liberal democracy:
1. Social contract metaphor structures the way that politicians think about the past and
the responsibility of a new regime for a past regime’s unjust acts.
2. The rule of law forbids the exercise of force without legal authority
3. The ideology of democracy ascribes great value to inclusive participation.
4. Openness is a significant value. (Freedom of speech, press, assembly, etc.)
91
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5. Many people throughout the world express their desire to live under a liberal
democratic regime because it holds out the promise of justice. 93
For Calhoun, the social contract represents an ‘invented tradition’ by liberalism, an anachronism
for our current society. Social contract theory has contributed three things to liberal democratic
theory. First, it contributes the rule of law, which provides predictability, consistency and
impartiality of judgments. Second, it contributes a legitimate source of law by way of the consent
of the governed. Third, it contributes a “surprising model for radical, yet peaceful, political
change.”94 Calhoun derives her vision of the social contract from a Hobbesian model, explicitly
invoking and citing the Leviathan, but I believe she fails to grapple with the implications of his
entire work, specifically that people are incapable of change and that they act according to natural
laws.
Calhoun goes on to argue that social contract theory divides time into three phases or eras:
the past, the devising of the social contract, and the post-contractual society. In this way, there is
an organizing of our thoughts about the present society and what constitutes the ‘past’ before the
contract. In the past, there is no reason to assess ‘crimes’ committed under the state of nature.
Because violence is unavoidable, any normative assessment is irrelevant. Standards of society do
not bear on the state of nature. In the second phase, the procedures involved in the devising of the
social contract “inveighs against holding individuals responsible for unjust acts committed during
the state of nature. People may not be excluded from the social contract on the basis of their past
offenses.”95 The social contract then established the rule of law, which promises equal protection
under the law, as well as predictability, because punishments for crimes are already known. For
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this reason, there should be no retroactive prosecution. Lastly, in the post-contractual society,
Calhoun believes that the social contract should be forward-looking. The erasure of the past is
necessary for order. It is clear that the author does not seriously consider the social contract theory
of Hobbes, as well as providing no mention or citation of Rousseau. I believe that her analysis
would have been better served if she considered his contract theory. Lastly, Calhoun analyzes the
nation-state as a single, cogent actor instead of understanding that there are ruling classes, and
class conflict which can drive the policy choices of governments.
The best interpretation and application of the social contract to a subject related to
transitional justice, although not precisely regarding it, comes from the Norwegian Peacebuilding
Resource Centre. It is important to note that this concept note is concerned with peacebuilding
generally, and not transitional justice specifically. Mezzera, et. al. begin by acknowledging the
contributions of Rousseau to the concept of the social contract. Unlike in this thesis, they focus on
the normative features of the social contract, or what a social contract ought to look like, as well
as the descriptive features. From Rousseau, they identify two politico-philosophical lineages:
“[f]or the liberal-individualistic lineage, a social contract should serve to maintain property rights
and public order. For the human rights and equity lineage, social justice is the goal.” 96 Although it
is true that both lineages have motivated political decisions, in the liberal-individualistic lineage it
seems easier to find the domination contract, inasmuch as the focus of the contract is on property
rights and public order.
In the democratic, industrialized parts of the world, the authors state that there is a political
equilibrium which balances the interests of different groups within society, which is to be
contrasted with ‘conflict-afflicted’ countries. In these countries, the equilibrium includes more
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than just the state — political elites, non-state actors, and informal institutions share the
responsibilities and revenues that normally would flow entirely through the state. Such
equilibriums fail to deliver universal standards of governance and are considered unstable.
The authors then present a comprehensive definition of a social contract, as developed by
a team commissioned by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The
social contract is “a process for bargaining, articulating and mediating society’s expectations of
the state”97 with 5 key features:
1. expectations that a given society has of a given state
2. state capacity to provide services, including security, and to secure revenue from its
population and territory to provide these services (in part a function of economic resources)
3. élite will to direct state resources and capacity to fulfil social expectations
4. the existence of political processes through which the bargain between state and society is
struck, reinforced and institutionalised
5. legitimacy plays a complex additional role in shaping expectations and facilitating political
process.98
Important to the features and definition of the social contract is that everything is seen as in flux.
The social contract is a process; it is the bargaining, articulating, and mediating of society’s
expectations over how state capacities will be used through political processes directed by elite
will, and in exchange for a conferral of legitimacy upon the state by the members of society.
The authors go on to distinguish between a social contract and a social covenant. A social
covenant is a horizontal agreement between groups across various demographic differences within
a political community to cooperate together and with the state. In the context of preparing a
document to inform peacekeeping policies, this makes sense; peacekeeping missions sometimes
deal with quite literal covenants, written down and signed, which are a part of some accords, peace
treaties, or even a constitution. The social covenant may also be interpreted broadly, and
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philosophically. According to the definition that the authors use, a social covenant can be seen as
creating the society whereas the social contract creates the state. The social covenant is seen as
determining the fundamental principles and values that undergird society. On this interpretation, I
would compare the author’s distinction to that of Mills’ distinction between the moral social
contract and the political social contract.
The other concept which the authors relate to the social contract is social cohesion, which
“refers to the reduction of disparities, inequalities, and social exclusion within or between societal
groups, as well as the strengthening of social relations, interactions, and trust. Such disparities
often coincide with political divisions and forms of organied [sic] violence, sometimes driven by
long–standing grievances and collective humiliation.” 99 Social cohesion and social contracts are
interrelated. Poor social cohesion can be repaired by renegotiating the social contract. Likewise,
poor social cohesion undermines the stability of the existing social contract.
Given this discussion by the authors, it is clear that there can be meaningful dialogue with
political scientific research related to transitional justice and social contract theory. This being
said, there was little engagement with the philosophical aspects of the social contract and what
defines them. The most positive aspects of the authors’ contribution is that they recognize that the
state is not one cogent actor but, rather, influenced by elites and other social groups pushing and
pulling policy decisions, and that the social contract is as much a process as it is a thing at a
particular moment in time.
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5. Why Do People Commit Genocide?
In conducting my research for this thesis, in discussions with non-academics, a frequent
question I would get is “why do people commit genocide?” There are of course racially tinged, or
orientalizing, explanations for some genocides. For example, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia
was merely the result of “primordial hatreds and ancient grievances,” according to neoconservative
thinkers.100 Foreign policy experts like Robert Kaplan, whose writings influenced Bill Clinton’s
foreign policy, set aside the secular, political interests of factions in war and instead portrayed the
violence in the Balkans as a result of tribal and religious conflict that went back centuries. This is,
obviously, an unscientific view of the subject. Ethnic divisions do play a part in conflict, but it is
better understood as a modifier to the conflict. Ethnic, racial, and religious groupings lead to
sorting among participants in conflicts. If, as Carl von Clausewitz is correct in saying that “[w]ar
is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political
commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means”101 then perhaps we might say that genocide
is

a

continuation

of

contentious

politics

by

other

means.

Charles Tilly extensively developed theories in contentious politics, which he defined as
“discontinuous, public, collective claim-making in which one of the parties is the government.” 102
When politics become contentious, there is a higher chance of ‘collective violence,’ episodic social
interactions characterized by the inflicting of damage, towards both people and objects, and some
level of coordination. During periods of contentious politics, coordination is usually preceded by
‘boundary activation,’ the “shift in social interactions such that they increasingly (a) organize
around a single us-them boundary and (b) differentiate between within-boundary and cross-
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boundary interactions.”103 Social inequality — often a source of contentious politics — is
generated by exploitation and opportunity hoarding, the securing of a valuable resource by and for
a categorically bounded network. Boundary activation is often in response to threats, whether
perceived or real, to hoarded opportunities and resources, with the boundaries mapping onto the
bounded network. The distribution and arrangement of opportunities and exploitation influence
the propensity for one type of boundary to be activated over others. So, even in a deeply
misogynistic society, there might be little solidarity between women of different ethnic groups if
socio-economic arrangements are determined by ethnicity.
In the course of boundary activation, the heightening of contention leads to greater attempts
to coordinate collective action. Organizations, as well as individual organizers, seek to build power
by incorporating previously inactive members of their group, resulting in brokerage, the “linking
of two or more previously unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relations with one
another and/or with yet other sites.”104 Brokerage is a type of relational mechanism, a social
mechanism which alters the connections between and among people. Relational mechanisms,
along with dispositional and environmental mechanisms, combine and reproduce to trigger social
change. Social processes are sequences of mechanisms which replicate in patterns, often leading
to similar outcomes. Four processes, or groups of mechanisms, common to contentious politics are
mobilization, political identity formation, coalition formation, and polarization. Tilly defines
polarization as the
widening of political and social space between claimants in a contentious episode and the
gravitation of previously uncommitted or moderate actors towards one, the other, or both
extremes. When it occurs, polarization is an important accompaniment to contentious
episodes because it vacates the moderate center, impedes the recomposition of previous
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coalitions, produces new channels for future ones, fills even the most pragmatic of policy
issues with ideological content.105
These processes also interact with and reproduce each other. Mobilization and coalition formation
often leads to an opposing coalition formation, and then polarization. What is significant about a
cycle of coalition formation and counter-coalition formation is for the linking of unrelated issues.
Imagine group A, group B, group ~A, and group ~B, with each letter pair groups holding
opposing positions. Groups A and B are more powerful than groups ~A and ~B, so groups ~A and
~B decide to form a coalition to fight against both groups A and B. Before the formation of the
first coalition, neither group A or B had any contact; however, faced with emboldened opponents,
a counter-coalition would beneficial for both. Subsequent iterations would add groups C and ~C,
D and ~D, etc. leading to polarization. This account of coalition formation and counter-formation
is simplistic, and provides a rational explanation for a social phenomena which may lack any
reasoned approach on the part of the actual decision makers. Once there is significant enough
polarization, the social practice of forming a coalition with the enemy of your enemy can detach
from initial utilitarian considerations and become instinctual, reactionary position-taking. When
an adversary is prone to automatic disagreement, a savvy group can bait their opponent into taking
unsavory positions or alliances which they would never have accepted under restrained
deliberations. Of course, not every coalition formation and mobilization leads to a counterformation, even in a polarized society; moreover, not every counter-coalition will have the same
level of coordination or resource pooling. Even in the baiting example, the forced alliance may be
in name only.
From examining contentious politics we can see processes that may precipitate genocide.
This is not to say that it is always the case. In most instance of contentious politics, there is no
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where near the level of violence that would approach that of a genocide or ethnic cleansing. Nor
have all cases of genocide historically been precipitated by contentious politics. I believe, however,
that in most cases there have been, such as in Rwanda and in the former Yugoslavia.
In both scenarios, prior to the outbreak of genocidal violence, there were transitions
towards a more liberal, democratic society. In Rwanda, President Habyarimana had announced in
1990 a transition towards a multi-party democracy. This was followed by an invasion of the RPF,
leading to a three year civil war that ended in 1993. With the Arusha Accords in place, there were
to be general elections for the national government with participation from multiple parties. The
election never happened because of the death of Hayarimana and the outbreak of the Rwandan
genocide. In the former Yugoslavia, the federal Yugoslav government moved towards ending one
party rule, but tensions between the Serbian and Croats and Slovenian Socialist Republics led to
secessions by the latter, and the yet to be recognized break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic.
The breakout of war led Croats and Slovenians in what is today the BiH to join arms with their
comrades from the Socialist Republics of Croatia and Slovenia respectively. The Bosnian Muslims
lacked a “brother republic” to defend them against Serbians, so they were subjected to ethnic
cleansing. Later the Kosovars faced ethnic cleansing for similar reasons as the Bosnian Muslims.
Why did the move towards, and potential for, political liberalization end up leading to genocidal
violence, and why did the violence mostly fall along ethnic lines?
In both situations, the move towards liberalization brought the potential (and in all
probability would have, had events unfolded differently) relative decline in the position of the
ruling ethnic group. There would not have been an inversion in power relations, where they became
the ruled over, but just a decline in power. In Rwanda, the stepping down of President
Habyarimana, a Hutu that implemented policies which benefited Hutus, and multiparty elections
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would have brought some Tutsis into government as well as moderate Hutus that wanted equal
treatment for both groups. In the former Yugoslavia, the Serb dominated Socialist Federal
Republic would have lost a substantial territorial loss with the secession of Croatia and Slovenia,
and Bosnian Serbs would not have been in the majority in a seceded BiH. Serbs in the remaining
republics still would have remained in power — in fact, with the departure of the other Socialist
Republics, their relative power within the remaining state would have increased! — but Serbian
power over the region would have waned. Facing such possibilities, Serbs and Hutus would have
had fewer opportunities and resources to hoard. With this threat, boundaries were activated, where
the boundaries were determined by the ethinc identity of the bounded network. This activation led
to mobilization, and cross-class coalitions. In the absence of strong civic institutions and the rule
of law, polarization accelerated unabadated into genocide. The only opposition to be found was in
the counter-coalitions and mobilization by Croats and Slovenians, and by the already armed and
mobilized Tutsi forces in the RPF.
Given these facts, it still may appear difficult to imagine that ordinary people would be
motivated to commit acts of genocide over what is fundamentally a question of unequal resource
distribution. Would you really be willing to kill innocent civilians for a better paying job, or a
slightly bigger home? Many of the participants in the conflict may not have actually benefited
from the uneven distribution of resources prior to the conflict. Certainly the risk of dying would
make participation in a campaign of ethnic cleansing imprudent. If it is difficult to imagine still
why most seemingly moral people would participate in a genocide, I ask the reader to consider
what Mark Twain wrote, and to think about some comparisons to other policies. Twain wrote:
There were two “Reigns of Terror,” if we would but remember it and consider it; the one
wrought murder in hot passion, the other in heartless cold blood; the one lasted mere
months, the other had lasted a thousand years; the one inflicted death upon ten thousand
persons, the other upon a hundred millions; but our shudders are all for the “horrors” of the
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minor Terror, the momentary Terror, so to speak; whereas, what is the horror of swift death
by the axe, compared with lifelong death from hunger, cold, insult, cruelty, and heartbreak? What is swift death by lightning compared with death by slow fire at the stake? A
city cemetery could contain the coffins filled by that brief Terror which we have all been
so diligently taught to shiver at and mourn over; but all France could hardly contain the
coffins filled by that older and real Terror—that unspeakably bitter and awful Terror which
none of us has been taught to see in its vastness or pity as it deserves. 106
I am not attempting to normatively compare between genocides, or to differentiate state policies.
Instead, we should consider that although there are genocides of ‘hot passion,’ people of seeming
normal moral compunction may not notice the long, slow genocide done in ‘heartless cold blood.’
Take for example the Israeli occupation of Palestine.
With Israel and Palestine, there was a quick, hot passionate moment of Terror — the Nakba,
or the “miraculous clearing of the land” from the Zionist perspective. 107 Ever since the Nakba,
parts or all of Palestinian territory (including both what the international community recoqnizes as
the territory in Gaza and the West Bank, and the Israel, which proponents of Palestinian liberation
also consider Palestinian land) have been occupied by the Israeli state, and to this day there is
significant strictures on all of Palestinain life.108 From control of who is allowed into and out of
Gaza and West Bank, to prohibitions on Palestinian fishing along their own coasts, to control over
the electrical and water supplies for the territories, the Israeli government exercises significant
authority over what is ostensibly Palestinian governed bodies, with no democratic recourse. The
Israeli policy towards legitimizing illegal settlements by Israeli settlers is nothing short of a slow
paced ethnic cleansing of Palestinian land. Paired with rampant killings of civilians, polluted water
supplies, denial of healthcare, the Israeli government is also slowly killing the Palestinian people,
making living conditions literally unlivable in the hopes that more Palestinians would leave, and
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Palestniain refugees would give up hope on returning. The question is, how can ostensibly moral
people support, or even perpetrate these crimes? 109
I invite the reader to consider lastly the era of Jim Crow. Again, I do not want the reader to
believe that I am drawing any normative comparisons. Everything discussed is bad and wrong,
and I am not here to order all of the harms of the world from most bad to least bad. I only invite
the reader to to consider these various cases to help get insight into how people get to a position
where they are willing to commit genocide. I need not belabor the horrors of the Jim Crow era. I
bring up the subject for only two reasons: 1. to show that millions of seemingly good, upstanding
people would support and participate in a system that wreaked a slow, heartless terror on millions
of their fellow citizens, much as Twain describes and 2. there is a difference between structural
inequalities and oppression, and a slow ethnic cleansing. The difference is the social contract.
African-Americans were, and are, a party to the social contract categorized as subhumans,
or second class citizens. This can be contrasted with the indigenous populations, who were
collectively subjected to multiple genocides at the hands of white America (as there were many
tribal nations that were wiped out), who are not considered a party to the American social contract.
The same may be said of Palestine. Some Israelis in fact try to argue essentially this point, that
because some of the past governments have sought a two-state solution that the Israeli government
does not have to be responsive to the demands of Palestinians living in Palestine (which ignores
the separate treatment for Israelis and Palestinians living in Israel). This is a misguided argument
because, as stated above, Israel controls, at a minimum, the borders, immigration policy, and trade
policy of the Palestinian territories, which makes it ruling the polity. Regardless, the mindset of
the Israelis who do not actively oppose the occupation of Palestine is that Palestinians are not a
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party to their social contract, and therefore ought not enjoy its protections. This is why there has
not only been a proliferation of extrajudicial killings of Palestinians by the Israeli Defense
Forces,110 but senior politicians have in fact encouraged soldiers to commit these killings. 111 From
this, it should be easier to see why people are willing to commit genocide: they do not see their
victims as a party to their social contract, and are therefore in the state of nature, devoid of socialpolitical obligations. To look more into the psychology of perpetrators, I turn to Claudia Card and
a theory of evil.
According to Claudia Card’s atrocity theory, evil(s) can be understood as “foreseeable
intolerable harms produced by culpable wrongdoing.”112 On Card’s theory, evil is defined by both
the perspective of the victim (the harm felt) and the perpetrator (the wrongdoing committed).
Additionally, the wrongdoing includes inaction, insofar as the harm is foreseeable and the actors
are culpable for the inaction. So, the British (lack of) response to the Irish famine(s) could be
considered evil insofar as mass starvation was foreseeable and the government had a responsibility
to the Irish people to provide for their welfare. Card’s theory of evil goes beyond mass harms to
include domestic abuse, or what she terms “terrorism in the home” to contrast with rape as a
weapon of war.113 What is important to this thesis is her approach to the psychological question of
why people do evil.
Card begins her discussion of the psychological reasons behind evil with Kant’s theory of
radical evil. It’s worth noting that Kant has a similar account of the social contract to Rousseau, in
some ways. Most notable (in my opinion) is his view on the unsociable sociability of human
beings, which is similar to Rousseau’s account of amour-propre and amour de soi. In fact, they
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are so similar that Rawls referred to Kant as “the best interpreter of Rousseau.” 114 Returning to
evil, according to Kant, there is a two step process to our actions and motivations. First, one adopts
a supreme principle to abide by, such as the Categorical Imperative, and then one acts in the real
world according to what said supreme principle legislates. The ‘good will’ is the motivation that
people have to act according to what duty prescribes, and acting on the good will is what makes
an act a moral act. Evil, for Kant, has three gradients, or stages. In the first stage, people are weak,
inasmuch as they adopt the correct supreme principle but they sometimes fail to act according to
its legislation, giving in to self-interest or other inclinations. In the second stage, people have mixed
motives, and act both from the good will and self-interest. In the third stage, radical evil takes hold
and people have subverted the moral principle, which ought to be the supreme principle, to the
principle of self-interest, or prudence. To reiterate, Kant’s analysis is at the level of motivation,
not action. So in four situations, four people could each separately act according to the good will,
to weakness, to mixed motives, and to radical evil, and all perform the same act. What defines
radical evil is that the motivation is prudence, not a sense of duty.
What distinguishes the good and evil is that a moral supreme principle legislates actions
whereas the principle of prudence does not. Evil is not simply posed as doing the not-moral thing.
As such, Kant’s theory denies the existence of (fundamentally) evil desires, interests, or immoral
principles. He denies that people have essentially diabolical inclinations; however, he does
acknowledge that there are ‘diabolical vices.’ Kant argues that these vices “do not really issue from
nature as their root but are rather inclinations, in the face of the anxious endeavor of others to attain
a hateful superiority over us to procure it for ourselves over them for the sake of security as
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preventive measure.”115 So these vices “at first appears to be an evil inclination is at bottom a
response from fear based on our felt need for the goods of protection and security. [Kant] insists
that evil lies only in our choices to accord too much importance to our inclinations, not in the
inclinations themselves.”116 The problem with Kant’s view of radical evil and the good will is that
if one acts neither according to duty nor to prudence, there appears to be no answer.
To answer ‘Kant’s mystery,’ as Card refers to the third possible motivation, she turns to
theories of normative self-conception. Herein lies a distillation of Kant’s views that he himself
only partially made. According to Kant, we could assess the morality of our actions and
motivations by imagining an impartial rational spectator with perfect knowledge (i.e. God) and
whether such a spectator would judge us as having acted morally. The perfect scenario for Kant’s
ethics is that we act only according to our duty and that we are happy in our conduct. The only
entity capable of giving us true happiness is God, and God seeks to reward those who act morally.
As such, “[t]he moral worth of an action in Kant’s ethics, conferred by the motive of duty, makes
one worthy of being rewarded with happiness by an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly just
rational spectator. Actual reward is not the goal. (That goal would make the behavior prudent.)
The goal is to be worthy — worthy of a reward that would symbolize the esteem of its bestower.”117
So if the moral worthiness of actions derives from the esteem of God, we can understand a third
motivation as an inclination for the esteem of others (who are not God). The desire for the esteem
of others is not itself the motivation of prudence (or self-interest), but a desire to fulfill one’s selfconception. To elucidate this third motivation, Card first draws on Christine Korsgaard’s theory
of self-conception as a source of normativity.
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According to Korsgaard, normativity can be sourced from one’s self conception, or
‘practical identity.’ A ‘practical identity’ is “a description under which you value yourself, a
description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth
undertaking.”118 So, our practical identities may have a host of constituent, contingent principles
or inclinations, which may or may not be self-consciously recognized. A desire to act according to
our self-conception can then be added to the principle of prudence as a principle to which morality
may be subverted as a supreme principle. Evil can then be expanded to include the subverting of
morality to one of these contingent principles. As such, “what is given priority over morality need
not be prudence but could be the good of some specific group, such as one’s racial or ethnic group
or one’s gender. One could be as willing to give up one’s own individual interests, or even to die,
to promote that good as others are willing to do for the sake of moral ideals.” 119 Here we can see
where nationalism may take hold. The desire to further the interests of one’s nation (and not merely
defend legitimate interests, as what might be considered self-defense, and therefore be morally
permissible or even obligated), may be seen as neither stemming from a sense of morality nor
prudence, but stemming instead from our self-conceptions, and a desire to live according to the
precepts which we believe to define our practical identity.
Korsgaard’s theory can also help explain why people behave in different moral ways to
members of one’s own group and non-members. Robert J. Lifton, in an account of Nazi doctors,
posits a the concept of ‘doubling.’ With doubling, people create a ‘second self’ so that they can
perpetrate behaviors which would be inconsistent with one’s ostensible values. 120 The question
then is that are people doing good acts (in a utilitarian sense) and acting truly according to moral
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principles (the good will) in only some cases, and doing bad acts (in a utilitarian sense) for bad
reasons, or are the good acts and bad acts done for the same reason — membership in a shared
group and non-membership. Korsgaard’s analysis may offer an answer. According to Card:
[k]indness and respect are not morally good if they are based not on the humanity of their
recipients but on the recipients’ membership in a more limited group. Yet behavior shares
features with moral behavior that distinguish it from mere prudence: racist behavior can
include self-sacrifice, for example. If the source of normativity is the conception of oneself
as a member of a superior group who is free to treat outsiders in hostile ways, the resulting
norms are neither moral nor prudential. 121
The resulting norms do not have a clear category in ethical theories, but are known as racist, sexist,
etc. To build on Korsgaard’s theories, Card turns to Lorna Smith Benjamin and IPIRs.
Benjamin theory of IPIRs, Important Persons and their Internalized Representations, comes
from an extension of attachment theory. John Bowlby defines attachment behavior as “any form
of behaviour that results in a person attaining or retaining proximity to some other differentiated
and preferred individual, who is usually conceived as stronger and/or wiser” and that such behavior
in adults tends to be “especially evident when a person is distressed, ill, or afraid.” 122 Benjamin
argues that attachment to an important other person can explain otherwise irrational behavior. The
internationalization of these important other persons, in Benjamin’s system, “can take the form of
imitation (of the person’s treatment of others, such as oneself), recapitulation (of one’s early
responses to the person), or introjection (treating oneself as the person used to treat one).” 123
According to Bowlby, children will often retain representations of important persons, such as
caregivers, and use their relationships as models for evaluate their behavior towards others.
Benjamin’s hypothesis is that there is a similar relationship with adults and models of behavior
based on important persons, which she designates as the IPIRs. The IPIR approach takes us into
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the minds of people to understand the behavior from the agent’s perspective, and to see if their
behavior can be understood as a pattern of responses or reenactments of the behavior of IPIRs.
Card believes that this approach to understanding behavior and motivations can have
implications for theories of moral change, as we understand that norms and values are implicit in
the behavior patterns of IPIRs we seek to imitate, recapitulate, or introject. If the IPIRs that
individuals are attached to are cruel, then it stands to reason that said individuals will tend to act
cruelly, if they act unreflexively and do not have a strong good will. Even if they do self-reflect to
some extent, this will still hold because said individuals will not only have behavior patterns based
on their cruel IPIRs, but they will seek the admiration and esteem of someone who is cruel. The
path towards moral change, according to the theory of IPIRs, is to either deliberately act in a
behavior different from that of the cruel IPIRs or to lessen one’s attachment to cruel IPIRs. In this
way, our initial inclinations may be cruel and we may be said to not be in control of behavior
inasmuch as our IPIRs were determined by our caregivers and their behavior, but people are
morally culpable insofar as they fail to reflect on the morality of their IPIRs and choose not to
adjust themselves if their IPIRs are immoral.
Concluding, Card states that “[e]ver since Thomas Hobbes set the tone, modern Western
philosophers have expended much energy either advocating egoism or else defending morality
against it... Affiliation is what has been presumed to require explanation, not self-interest. In
attachment theory, the presumption seems to be the reverse... Attachment precedes self-interest,
even any sense of self.”124 With Korsgaard’s and Benjamin’s theories, Card presents an updated
theory of Kant’s radical evil. By subverting morality to principles which derive from practical
identities, that are themselves informed by our IPIRs, people may act in a radically evil way
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without having subverted morality to prudence. Kant specifies that we have an imperfect duty to
ourselves to self-improve because we self-improvement means that we as moral agents are more
likely to fight evil temptations, and to adhere to the good will, towards which we have a perfect
duty. Even if people fall to weakness or mixed motivations, where the principles derive from our
practical identity instead of morality, people could greater perfect themselves by ensuring that the
IPIRs

from

which

self-conceptions

derive

are

morally

righteous

IPIRs.

In evaluating Card’s theories of evil and the psychological motivations to do evil, we can
see a compatibility with the ideas of Rousseau (and Descartes) as presented in the first section, on
the social contract. Rousseau believes that humans are born good, and society corrupts them. Kant
believes that people are capable of acting from the good will, and that diabolical vices are not from
nature, but from social competition and the scarcity of goods. Additionally, the principles of selfmanagement and self-improvement are evident in Kant’s belief in perfectibility and that people
are capable of changing their IPIRs, thereby further proving the Cartesian model over the
Hobbesian model of human nature.
Furthermore, we can see in the diabolical vices and IPIRs why people commit genocide.
The desire for hateful superiority over others, the anxiety of social competition, and the fear of
loss of goods and security lead people to act against what morality prescribes. Contentious politics
creates the environments where diabolical vices can find root. When conflict does arise, the IPIRs
that people subconsciously look to are less likely to have mercy and compassion as their guiding
principles, but instead cruelty and malice. In conflict, people valorize those who are willing to do
violence for the sake of their group. Self-defense is of course recognized as a legitimate motivation
for violence, but the problem is that groups will extend their believed defense interests beyond
what is recognized as actual self-defense. The social group in a position of power may often
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perceive threats to their privileged position as threats to their fundamental interests instead of
threats to a system which creates positions of privilege. This is because victimhood (or at least a
sense of victimhood) has nothing to do with one’s initial position in society.
According to Daniel Bar-Tal, et. al., “[a] sense of collective victimhood is unrelated to the
strength and power of the collectives involved in intractable conflict. Collectives that are strong
and powerful militarily, politically and economically still perceive themselves as victims or
potential victims in the conflict. The self-assigned status as the victim does not necessarily indicate
weakness.”125 This is what happened with America in the Vietnam War, Israelis in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, the Turks in their conflict with the Kurds, and more. Victimhood is important
for after conflicts, as well. According to Peskin:
being designated as a victim is a source of political strength for governments. Victim status
can confer global recognition of a nation’s suffering and legitimacy to the government in
power. This in turn may lead to increased aid and support for the new regime... For
governments, the writing of this narrative plays a key role in maintaining their domestic
and international legitimacy and in turn solidifying their grip on power. 126
So we can see the importance of the perceived status of victimhood in not just legitimating the use
of power, but in holding the power as well. So in answering the question, why would someone
commit genocide, we can start from the question, “what would most people be willing to do or
support if they believed that their social group was a victim, regardless of whether or not they
actually were victims?” The answer to this question for many people is unrestrained violence,
especially when the perceived victimizer is no longer, or never was, seen as a party to the social
group of one’s social group.
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6. The Social Contract Under Transitional Justice
Before we can understand the social contract under transitional justice, it is first important
to answer the question, when did transitional justice begin? The field of transitional justice as a
field of legal scholarship began in the 1990s.127 The aftermath of WWII is generally considered
the source of the first transitional justice mechanisms — the war criminals tribunals in Nuremberg
and Tokyo. The prosecution of Nazi and Imperial Japanese officials is certainly one of the most
famous, although Bass identifies earlier possible claimaints to the title. Bass points to ultimately
botched war crimes trials in Constantinople, in 1919, to prosecute Turkish officials for crimes
against the Armenians and the trials in Leipzig, two years later, against the German high command
for war crimes against Allied troops.128 Going back even further, there were trials of a sort that
may have served as some inspiration for the post-WWI forces — the exiling of Napoleon to St.
Helena in 1815. Done absent any legal pretensions, the act was the first of its kind. Victor’s justice
had always existed, and in another universe Napoleon may have gotten the gallows (or the
guillotine), but the forces of the Seventh Coalition decided to punish Bonaparte and his
accomplices for the ‘crime’ of aggression. Realistically, the arresting and exiling of these figures
was done to both satisfy France’s former enemies, but also to better secure the Bourbon restoration.
Herein we can see the kernel of transitional justice which I believe is key to understanding its
social contract: securing the legitimacy and existence of the ruling regime.
I argue that we could go back even further to find examples of transitional justice. Perhaps
the first is the trial and execution of King Charles I of England. With the Grand Remonstrance, a
list of grievances drawn up by Parliament and presented to Charles before the English Civil War,

127
128

Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘NonField,’” 7.
Bass, for Leipzig, 58-105, for Constantinople, 106-46.

53

the trials for treason at the tribunal established by the Parliament and the New Model Army, and
the performance of the punishment for the guilty verdict (death), we have both a justice mechanism
during a period of transition from a less liberal government (King Charles I ruling by fiat, having
dissolved Parliament) to a more liberal government (although illiberal by today’s standard). It may
have been victor’s justice, but it cannot be said that Charles failed to provide ample reasons for
retribution.129 Additionally, after the Stuart Restoration in 1660, King Charles II faced the question
of what to do to those who had executed his father. Believing that forgiveness would better fit the
political environment, Charles II offered a general pardon for all who conspired against Charles
I.130
I also consider the trial and execution of King Louis XVI of France as a transitional justice
mechanism. Compared to the trial of Charles I, the list of charges against Louis XVI were much
more numerous and expansive, to include actions taken by Louis to suppress the beginnings of the
revolution. What is interesting is how often deputies of the Convention referenced Rousseau
during their deliberations over what to do with Louis XVI. Of all philosophers, Rousseau is
brought up 47 times, more than all other thinkers or scholars combined. 131 Although the terror that
followed may have been terrible, it is unarguable that the revolution which overthrew King Louis
XVI led to a more a liberal government. If regicide seems hardly to qualify as transitional justice,
then the aftermath of the victory of Haitian forces in their revolution may seem a better fit.
After having secured the island and promulgated a new constitution, the second only in the
world, President Dessalines ordered, in February of 1804, trials for those accused of participating
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in massacres committed by General Leclerc and General Rochambeau. 132 Additionally,
Dessalines, “convened a commission to investigate atrocities committed by the French. Mostly
this was focused on specific acts committed during the recent occupation by Leclerc and
Rochambeau, but it was also interested in compiling a general list of crimes, going back into the
days of the old slave regime.”133 According to Mike Duncan, the purpose of the commission was
not to aid in the prosecutions of the accused participants in these massacres, but rather to establish
the collective guilt of the white French population as a whole. The pretext, then, of the commission
and the trials was to justify the killing of most of the remaining white French in Haiti. President
Dessalines personally supervised many of the killings, in tours of cities throughout Haiti. Only
some white widows and children were spared, along with Polish soldiers who had gone AWOL
instead of fighting the Haitians, and Germans who had been given permission to live in Haiti prior
to the massacres.134 In Haiti, although the revolutionaries traded a new Republic for a selfproclaimed President turned Emperor, it seems inarguable that ending slavery meant that the
transition was towards a more liberal society.
What all of these examples have in common is that they are examples of transitional justice,
of a sort, that took place around the time of the creation of the social contract as a concept. Hobbes’
Leviathan was written at the same time as the English Civil War and was published only two years
after the execution of Charles. Rousseau was alive for the events that preceded the French
Revolution — he was even invited to help write the constitution for Corsica after their revolution
against the Republic of Genoa.135 Kant lived through the French Revolution and wrote about it as
well. So we should understand that the relationship between the social contract and periods of
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transition is that the social contract must be viewed through the emergence from the state of nature
during a transitional period. The periods of transition in today’s age should not be seen as separate
from the past times in European and American history, but as analogous. The only difference
between the two periods is the timing of the arrival of capitalism and nationalism. I believe that
these forces are what propel the social change leading to a new social contract — the Social
Contract.
If the social contract of (current) transitional justice is no different from the social contract
of the past revolutionary times, then we can understand the aims of current transitional justice
mechanisms as playing an analogous role to the trials and commissions of the past. The purpose
of transitional justice is the securing and entrenching of power by and for the ruling class. As
Rousseau argues, the purpose of the emergence from the state of nature (in the broad sense) into
the state of society by the creation of the social contract is to preserve the unequal distribution of
resources and power. Transitional justice mechanisms are used to preserve the power of the ruling
class in a number of ways. To be clear, there are few situations where transitional justice
mechanisms are deployed to hold the current ruling class accountable, but rather the former ruling
class by the new ruling class. Where the ruling class has not changed during transitions, amnesties
are the order of the day.
In the case of international tribunals, there is the straightforward argument in favor of them
for the ruling class in a country that trials can be used to quite literally get rid of the opposition.
This was the case in the former Yugoslav countries. In what is today Serbia (but at the time was
known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), the arrest of Slobodan Milošević only happened
after he and his party lost an election. The new president wanted to get rid of a powerful political
opponent, as well as end international sanctions and later join the EU, so his government permitted
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the arrest and transfer of Milošević to the ICTY.
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Similar circumstances played out in Croatia

with former President Franjo Tuđman, as well. Paul Kagame, current President of Rwanda, faced
different circumstances than in the Balkan countries. The RPF’s rule was much more secure after
the end of the Rwandan genocide. Peace had not been negotiated, like with the Dayton Agreement
in the former Yugoslavia, but had been obtained through blood and sacrifice. As such, there was
less of a need to get rid of any opposition politicians who had been complicit in the killings. This
is, for one reason, why the ICTR was in Arusha and not The Hague, like the ICTY. It’s also why
the scope of the ICTR’s temporal jurisdiction only covers the Rwandan genocide, and does not
extend earlier to include crimes committed in 1990-1993, which may have implicated the RPF.
Kagame had a stronger hand to play in negotiations with the international community.
International trials had another important aspect, which is why Rwanda ultimately complied with
ICTR

requests:

the

benefits

of

the

status

of

victimhood.

As I discuss in the previous section, the status of victimhood is very important for the
obtaining and maintenance of power. Trials allow for the promulgation of victimhood status, and
international trials do this on the international stage. Moreover, the recognition of victimhood at
the international stage can be used in domestic politics. Because the ICTR was limited to
prosecuting crimes that had only happened in 1994, Kagame has been able to create a narrative
about the causes of the genocide, and thereby minimize the culpability of the RPF. In doing so, he
is trying to reconstruct the collective memory of the events, and thereby strengthening the power
of the RPF, the ruling party in Rwanda.137 It is for this reason that people such as Janine Clark, as
I discuss in the second section, is critical of the NURC and the unity process.
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Truth and reconciliation commissions can function in a similar way to trials, in the
construction of collective memories. In some instances, truth commissions are used to address
grassroots demands without actually permitting fuller accounts of culpability by limiting the
permitted scope of analysis.138 This is often achieved by focusing on particular facts and events
and removing the context or normative judgments about those facts. Audrey R. Chapman and
Patrick Ball refer to these as ‘micro-truths’ and ‘macro-truths,’ where the latter is far more
important for framing a narrative for a population.139 The good news is that if a new government
is representative and responsive to its population, then the transitional justice mechanism is in a
way a positive development, as it reinforces the power of a responsive government.
Another transitional justice mechanism that is used to preserve the power of the ruling class
is lustration. In this case, there is some dispute over the ruling class, with the newer contender
being ascendent. Lustration can achieve, among other things, “the reorganization and revitalization
of the state’s administrative organs; the imposition of economic and social penalties on the old
regime’s functionaries; and the overall circulation of elites, which provides employment
opportunities for the new regimes supporters.” 140 Here we can clearly see the prizes of being a
member of the ruling class’ cohort. As I discuss in the previous section, there is resource and
opportunity hoarding, as government jobs can be highly sought after.
Lastly, amnesties may be necessary for a new government to maintain power while it is
still weak, and the previous ruling elites still retain a good amount of power. Here, the transitional
justice mechanism is chosen as a necessity, if it can be said to be a choice. Some, such as Calhoun,
argue that amnesty may not be a mere necessary evil, but vital for the creation of a new social
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contract. Calhoun argues “[t]he promise of future obedience is sufficient atonement for all the past
crimes. The injustices of the past can have no practical or moral relevance under the social
contract.”141 Leniency towards strongmen is necessary to achieve full participation in the process
of contracting a new society. Calhoun goes so far as to argue that illiberal or anti-democratic parties
ought not be excluded, as “[a]ll views are welcome in a democracy,” 142 although she does give
exceptions, such as the exclusion of Nazis in Germany.
What, then, is the social contract under transitional justice? It is the same social contract as
the contract of Haiti, the United States, and France, which is to say a contract of inequality and
domination. The only difference is the existence of a scholarly enterprise to study and legitimize
certain social practices. The more interesting subject is how the modern social contract differs
from previous social contract. As I argue in section 1, new social contracts come from the
emergence from the broad state of nature, and they may come from the state of nature of war and
anarchy or the state of nature under tyrannical governments which do not respect civil and political
rights. Previous social contracts were limited in their reach. They were between the sovereign and
the nobility, and then contracts between nobles and their serfs, or later subjects. There were no
citizens, only rulers and the ruled. As Benno Teschke argues, international relations can be
understood through the lens of social property relations. 143 Monarchs had a social property relation
with their realm. They owned the land, and the subjects simply inhabited the land. The feudal
social contract was defined by such terms. The modern social contract is different inasmuch as
relationship is framed by a social property relationship of the nation and the state. The nation —
the people — own the land. The state is then created to arbitrate disputes within the nation. From
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this we can see why genocides happen. One group of people imagines themselves as a nation, for
which there is some plot of land which they own. If there are people on that land that are not a part
of the nation, then they are not a party to their social contract, and can justifiably (in the minds of
some) be removed from the land. Transitional justice, if it is achieving anything related to the
social contract, is to integrate groups into one nation.
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7. A Third State of Nature
Lastly, I believe that there may be what we could think of as a third state of nature. As I
discuss in section 1, Rousseau believes that there are two states of nature. There is a state of nature
in “its purity, and [the second state of nature] is the fruit of an excess of corruption.” 144 In these
two states of nature, people’s rights are unprotected and the rule of the strongest dominates. In the
original state of nature it is because political authority has not been established, and in the second
state of nature it is because the government is tyrannical and people’s rights are subject to the
whims of individuals. From both there is a violent break to enter, or return to, a new state of society
through a new social contract. I believe that we can imagine a third state of nature, but one far less
violent than the second state of nature, and the emergence from it is far better. This third state of
nature is not a state of nature in the traditional sense, or even perhaps on the broadest of
interpretations. It is probably best understood as a simulacrum of the state of nature. There is still
established political authority and a high level of sociability, but governments may not be secure
when faced with sustained civil disobedience marshalled by social movements. As such, a third
state of nature is brought about by social movements engaged in civil disobedience and other forms
of contentious politics so as to achieve radical changes in society, which we can imagine as living
under a new social contract. To understand how this works, we need to understand how social
movements are able to achieve moral progress.
Turning to Elizabeth Anderson, she expands on Tilly’s theories of social movements and
contentious politics to address moral progress. She begins with John Dewey’s theory of moral
pragmatism.145 According to Dewey, the interdependence of human beings — the necessity of
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assistance, coordination, and cooperation among people — requires the institution of rules of
conduct to regulate and order human activity. The creation and dissemination of social
conventions, traditions, norms, etc. provides for a level of predictability beyond that which ad hoc
agreements could offer. Norms are accepted and reproduced so long as they effectively structure
its relevant group.146
What makes moral norms distinct from social norms generally is that: a. moral norms
purport to carry the force of authoritative command b. conformity may be exacted from members
of the community c. authority of moral commands does not depend on any immediate or direct
good and d. shared moral expectations are colored by shared emotional dispositions. Compliance
with moral norms is expected regardless of what others do; if people believed that it was acceptable
to ignore obligations generated by some norm when it is ignored by others, such a norm could not
be understood as a moral norm. When two or more moral claims come into conflict, and the
precedent or applicability of particular moral norms is disputed, people appeal to higher order
moral principles to adjudicate between said interpersonal claims. 147
The application of higher order moral principles, as a social practice, is reflective, and the
structure of values and norms is subject to change. The impetus for change can arise from a few
situations: a. uncertainty over how accepted moral principles apply to particular conflicts b. the
application of a principle may produce new undesirable outcomes, or the previously undesirable
outcomes could be newly discovered and/or c. people may “challenge the legitimacy of a
customary norm or principle, by drawing attention to objectionable features of its operation and
failures in its purported justification.”148 Under any of these circumstances, moral norms or
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principles may require revision, or even replacement. On the pragmatist account, the failure of a
norm/principle to properly regulate and order social activity provides the reason for modifying or
abandoning said norm/principle. Rules, of any kind, exist so that the collective compliance yields
benefits for everyone above that which could be obtained absent those rules. The intended outcome
may or may not be known by the participating members — uncritical acquiescence may often
suffice. When, though, there is a disagreement or uncertainty about the efficacy or legitimacy of a
norm/principle, people are forced to consciously reflect on what the desired outcome actually is,
and whether it actually is desirable. Moral reflection is only rendered necessary when the normal,
habitual application of moral norms fails in one of the aforementioned ways.
Moral reflection over norms and principles is not an isolated, individual activity. Since
norms and principles exist only insofar as members of groups reproduce and abide by them,
changing them requires collective action. When it comes to moral norms in particular, social
movements play an important role in achieving moral progress through the bias correction of the
powerful. By bias, Anderson does not (exclusively) mean partial preferences or selfishness; rather,
the bias which social movements correct is an epistemological bias. Powerful elites, just like
everyone, view the world through their own limited perspective. We could understand this as
constituting part of the epistemological contract. The perspective of the powerful is limited in two
ways that are inherent to their social standing: arrogance and ignorance. The powerful are arrogant
when they perceive criticisms from below as merely vicious, or covetous. The powerful are
ignorant because their social standing does not place them in the material conditions of those below
them, and, therefore, cannot understand their interests. To overcome the epistemological problem,
social movements must: a. inform the powerful of the interests and needs of the oppressed b.
express what is needed to respect these interests as claims to change their conduct and to subject
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them to moral criticism and c. display their moral worthiness so as to seize the claim of moral
authority.149
The epistemological problem is not one that can be addressed by argumentation, alone. For
one, mere moral arguments are divorced from social practice, thus necessitating no practical
deliberation. Any conclusions arrived at in discussion, or principles enumerated, are taken as
hypotheticals and do not need to be acted upon by those a party to the discussion. After all, how
often do people find themselves confronted with a lever, trolley car tracks, and hogtied hostages?
Moreover, “practically realized moral norms are entrenched in largely unreflective habits which
are sustained by shared expectations of people’s duties and entitlements.” 150 It is not inconsistent
to suppose an individual who changes their mind in a moral argument over some issue, and to then,
later, revert back to their previously held belief. It requires no self-deception, intellectual
dishonesty, or bad faith engagement. In order to make meaningful, sustainable moral progress,
arguments need to be paired with action, particularly through contentious politics, so that practical
reasoning is engaged with as well as moral reasoning.
Furthermore, we might think of pairing arguments with action as a form of contracting or
consenting (or withholding consent) with the government. The epistemological problem can be
understood through the lens of the epistemological contract, as the contract defines who is a party
to the social contract and their prescribed roles. The disjunction in society over what should be
universally recognized moral norms, then, requires a new consensus over cognitive norms. Social
action, or what Mezzera, et. al. refer to as bargaining, articulating, and mediating with the state, is
required to form the conesus that the epistemological contract requires.
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Social movements engage with people’s moral and practical reasoning by producing an
epistemic break in the minds of the ruling class and its supporters. By epistemic break, I mean a
precipitous shift in belief caused by an action or event that forced significant reflection. Social
movements produce the conditions necessary for epistemic breaks by openly defying social norms.
Protests, sit-ins, mass demonstrations, etc. disrupt people’s sense of normalcy. People are then
forced to think about the impetus for public disruption, which then induces practical reasoning
about why the current norms have failed and possible alternative norms. When confronted with
‘effective contention,’ practical deliberation over alternatives is triggered in three ways. First, as
public opposition to norm compliance grows, popular support for such norms will decline. Second,
dwindling support for a norm may undermine its ability to adjudicate interpersonal conflicts, i.e.
the reason for its existence. Third, stubborn adherence to a contested norm can impose a moral
cost upon the powerful, and undermine its moral authority. 151
The legitimacy of the ruling class is contingent upon the source of its authority. Under
divine right, a ruler must appear pious. Under absolutism, a ruler must demonstrate lineage. Under
democracy (or, more specifically, a democratic republic), the state must be seen as representative
of the citizens. In a democracy, the state, by creating and enforcing laws, makes its members
subject to the same coercively imposed rules that no one can alter by acting on her own and
imposing such terms in the name of said members. Idealized, each citizen is both ruler of and ruled
by her fellow citizens. Such is the basis of the modern social contract and the idea of the consent
of the governed. The moral authority of the powerful elites derives from their ability to claim that
society, under their rule, is governed justly; in a democratic society, justice is measured by whether
its laws are ones which ideal citizens would choose for themselves. If a society’s legal institutions
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produce unpopular, harmful outcomes, then its laws are no longer acceptable, or just. Social
movements convey dissatisfaction with the status quo.
Returning to Tilly’s argument that social movements offer displays of worthiness, unity,
numbers, and commitment, Anderson outlines the necessity of these components for achieving
moral progress. All four components constitute conditions for collective self-presentation. As
summarized by Tilly:
Worthiness: sober demeanor; neat clothing; presence of clergy, dignitaries, and mothers
with children.
Unity: matching badges, headbands, banners, or costumes; marching in ranks; singing and
chanting.
Numbers: headcounts, filling streets. signatures on petitions, messages from constituents,
Commitment: braving bad weather; visible participation by the old and handicapped;
resistance to repression; ostentatious sacrifice, subscription, and/or benefaction. 152
Anderson argues that these four features are necessary for social movements to address the moral
biases of powerful elites. By displaying worthiness and commitment, social movements dispel the
arrogant bias that activists are selfish or vicious. Unity compels a level of internal agreement
necessary for attracting others to a movement. Numbers convey the scale of popular support for a
movement’s platform, as well as undermine perceived support for existing social norms. 153
With the biases of the powerful addressed, the moral arguments of social movements have
a real opportunity for consideration and uptake. One approach to understanding how displays are
able to create epistemic breaks is affect control theory. According to affect control theory, people’s
understanding of the world around them is regulated, in part, by their affective reaction to objects
and events around them. The topography of social life, and everything in it, is imbued with an
affective meaning. Affective meaning is the content of a symbolic attachment, an object that is
associated with affect and the definition of content is collectively shared by members within a
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society. People are motivated to maintain these affective meanings by perpetuating its meaning
and policing deviations from commonly accepted definitions. Emotions act as signals to convey
whether situations and events helped maintain people’s self-conceptions and self-identity
meanings. As signals, emotions facilitate both people’s anticipation of future (re)actions and the
ability to convey to others our own beliefs and opinions. 154
The reason that people strive to maintain affective meanings is two fold. Foremost,
affective meanings are necessary for helping people to understand the world around them and to
orient themselves accordingly. If an object lost its affective meaning, then it would become
difficult for people to effectively anticipate the future reactions of others because there is no longer
a collective shared understanding of that object. Stable (structures of) affective meanings, more
generally, help people control their own emotions, dispositions, mood, etc. Entering a world filled
with unclear affective meanings (or devoid of familiar meanings) would be disorienting, even
physically uncomforting. At a small, limited scale, the motive to maintain affective meanings is
functional — at a macroscopic level, the motivation becomes continued confidence in one’s ability
to accurately perceive reality. People can also be motivated to maintain affective meanings when
the meanings help explicate larger political, economic, and cultural structures; these structures
place individuals in roles relative to others and color social expectations, thereby establishing
hierarchies. Changes to certain affective meanings could alter how people understood the social
hierarchy; for those in privileged positions in society, maintaining affective meanings may be
necessary for maintaining their position within the social hierarchy. In this way, we can see how
the epistemological contract plays an important role: it helps define the privileges of certain social
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relations. Social movements achieve moral progress by both achieving tangible political
victories/policy schemes and changing social/moral norms. 155
Applying affect control theory to social movements, displays of emotions are a necessary
part of inducing practical reasoning and substantiating moral arguments. Passionate displays of
worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment underscore a social movement’s platform by
conveying the failure of powerful elites to uphold conditions necessary for maintaining selfconceptions. These displays achieve a level of cognitive uptake unobtainable through moral
argumentation. This is because moral arguments — the act of doing it, through (in)formal
institutions — are explicitly structured to only include arguments based on ‘logic and reason’ and
to only use ‘fact-based’ or quantitative evidence. In academia and elsewhere, appeals to emotion,
anecdotes, and narrative structures are dismissed as insufficient evidence. Whatever
epistemological or ontological views one may have, it is an undeniable fact that the majority of
people can find emotional/narrative arguments convincing, and can be skeptical of mathematical
or logically complex arguments. Emotions convey people’s affective relationship with the world,
and this is necessary for overcoming the arrogant and ignorant biases of powerful elites.
The reason social movements are able to induce practical reasoning among citizens about
social norms not only because emotional displays supplement moral argumentation — social
movements’ actions offend individuals’ moderate sensibilities by challenging, and violating, social
norms. There is no such thing as a convenient place to march or convenient time to go on strike.
Successful social movements are successful because they are able to mobilize sufficient numbers
of protesters to disrupt the daily lives of a large enough population. It is, of course, not socially
acceptable to sit in the middle of the street; when enough people get together to block entire
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highways, it makes people upset. But in disrupting their affect control by upsetting people, social
movements compel people to think about what would lead a large, unified number of worthy,
committed people to violate social norms. When a social movement becomes large enough,
popular support for contested norms fails to lead to shared acceptance and acquiescence, meaning
the affective meaning is lost. If a social movement is successful, then it will have presented new
social norms/affective meanings ready to replace the old norms/meanings, and people will have
accepted and internalized them.
During a social movement’s campaign, there comes a point where public discontent with
and rejection of current norms is enough to undermine the existence of affective meaning, but the
platform of new norms/meanings has not yet been widely accepted. In this limbo, some moderates
will deny the need for change and argue in the status quo’s defense, while others will proffer
incremental, concrete changes that maintain the overall material and ideological framework.
Others will recognize the inadequacy of the status quo’s social norms to regulate society, but reject
the social movement’s platform for new norms. Given a social movement’s unity, there generally
will not be significant internal disagreements about the fundamental tenets of the platform. Petty
squabbling, factionalism, and the narcissism of small differences can lead to organizational splits.
This, however, does not entail a fracture of the social movement; social movements are not clearly
structured organization, but rather informal, social entities. Rival, competing groups are still a part
of the same social movement because they are working for the same platform, even if the work is
not done together. How does this apply to the social contract?
Social movements achieve a third state of nature through civil disobedience by suspending
people’s beliefs in the regulatory power of moral norms and disrupting affective meanings. Mass
acts of civil disobedience disrupt people’s faith that they live in a well-ordered society. If people
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believed that they lived a morally just society, they would have no reason to mass protest or endure
police brutality or block roads and bridges and stage sit-ins at dinners. Because of civil
disobedience, people who believe themselves to be ethical individuals are faced with the question,
“is there something wrong with our society, and if so, what can I do to change it?” Because there
is a suspension of belief in the regulatory power of moral norms/meanings, people are forced to
examine what the principles society is based upon, and whether they ought to be changed.
Successful social movements are able to radically change not only institutions of power, but the
very moral conceptions that everyday people have about what is good and bad. Because of this
transformational power, social movements push society into a third state of nature, and thereby
force a new social contract to be written to govern society. As I state at the beginning of this
section, this third state of nature is not a state of nature in the traditional sense. But I refer to this
situation as a state of nature so as to convey what conditions are necessary for the creations of a
new social contract.
We can also think of the act of engaging in a social movement as taking a similar place as
the act of creating a social contract. As Anderson argues, moral argumentation and moral reasoning
is not enough to produce changes in people’s moral beliefs. In order to produce the type of
reflection necessary for actual change you must engage in practical reasoning, which is only
activated when thought is paired with practice. As Hobbes argues, laws of natures are preceptes or
general rules that are found out by reason.156 So, if social contracts are supposed to enshrine natural
laws into civil constitutions, then it can only be done when parties to the contract know the content
of natural laws. The powerful elites of course have their own beliefs, and we might say that they
actually have no intention of actually bringing natural laws into civil society because they just
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want to perpetrate a ruse against the poor. But, insofar as citizens believe that their society operates
on the consent of the governed and that their moral and political principles derive from natural
laws, then we must consider the act of engaging in practical reasoning so as to change the
foundational principles of society as an act of rewriting the social contract. As such, the purpose
of social movements is to demonstrate that their government does not, in fact, operate with the
consent of the governed.
Looking to countries undergoing transitional justice, I believe we can see what represents
the failure of social movements. Social movements are successful when they are (mostly) nonviolent. But when people are unable to petition their grievances in a peaceful manner, some people
will inevitably turn to violence. This mobilization in turn spurs a counter-mobilization, and leads
to violent contentious politics. From there, the situation can either escalate further, or the
government could accede to demands for reform. This very scenario is what led to the Troubles in
Ireland and the United Kingdom.157 In 1968, peaceful Catholic protesters in Northern Ireland
marched for changes to the voting laws, and for other reforms. They were met with violent
crackdowns by police. In 1969, loyalist mobs began attacking the Catholic protesters. Starting
April, loyalists went so far as to plant bombs at electrical plants and water refinement centers so
that the IRA would be blamed for it. 158 Protests later devolved into riots. In August, a particularly
bad riot broke out. By October of the same year, loyalists shot and killed an Irish police officer,
and the Troubles began. The peaceful protests of a social movement provoked a rage in the hearts
of loyalists, so instead of seeing their government concede reforms to the protestors, they met nonviolence with violence.
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The violence of the Troubles led to what Mezzera, et. al. calls ‘conflict-affected countries’
(or regions). In Northern Ireland you had non-state actors and informal institutions performing
tasks that normally were performed by the state. In such a situation, society (and really there were
almost two separate societies that co-habitated, between the Catholics and Protestants) devolved
in a way into a state of nature. There was some political authority, but it was constantly being
challenged, undermined, or even outright ignored. The Troubles was a war, in the sense that we
would consider a state of nature on the broad interpretation. As Hobbes argues, “so the nature of
war consisteth not in the actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time
there is no assurance to the contrary.”159 The war may not have been ‘hot’ the entire time, but the
possibility of a car bombing or assassination or ambush always laid around the corner.
Looking beyond Northern Ireland, we can see other situations where societies are close to
a state of nature, and societies undergoing transitions are faced with similar situations. Countries
faced with high degrees of social contradictions and conflicting material interests are then
vulnerable to falling into a state of nature. It may be the first state of nature where different factions
fight each other, it may be the second state of nature where the government suspends the rule of
law and brutally represses its people to avoid unrest or revolution, or it could be a third state of
nature where social movements upend society in a mostly non-violent way. In all three situations,
there will be a return to a state governed by a social contract. Wars eventually end in either defeat
for one side or a negotiated peace; repressions either fail and the government is toppled or succeed
and dissidents are routed; and social movements are either successfully repressed, break into war,
or succeed in not only securing changes to the material framework of society but also change
people’s conceptions of what constitutes a morally just society. When there is success, there is a
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new social contract, and we could understand this period as one of transitional justice. When there
is failure to change a regime, the old contract is reinstituted, or circumscribed, and there is no
transitional justice. By understanding social movements as vehicles for (relatively) peacefully
returning a society to a state of nature, thereby allowing for a new social contract to be written, we
can see how societies could be changed without genocide or war or revolution, and the
international community can implement policies to support the creation of social movements
throughout the world. Moreover, in countries that have undergone violence and now transitional
justice, it should be clear that the international community should support the conditions necessary
for social movements and transitional justice mechanisms should be understood as contributing to
this framework, because the continued success of transitional justice requires that governments
respond to the demands of its citizens. In this way, we can see how social contract theory and
transitional justice inform each other.
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